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Iago. "Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls;
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing; 
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."
Othello, The Moor of Venice, Act III, Scene III
v
INTRODUCTION
The media of radio and television permits a single 
voice to express a particular idea at a given time to a 
large cross section of the population with significant 
effects. When this voice utters a defamatory imputation, 
the effects of the broadcast upon the reputation of an 
innocent bystander becomes a matter of litigation. Al­
though litigation should balance the interests between 
free speech and the rights of the individual traduced, 
this is not always the case. Unfortunately, our legal 
system is so firmly grounded in the court decisions and 
laws of the past, that adaptation to the twentieth century 
phenomena of radio and television has resulted in anomolous 
distinctions and categories. These distinctions and cate­
gories require courts to decide whether a defamatory broad­
cast is slanderous per se, slanderous per quod, libelous 
per se, or libelous per quod; whether the broadcaster should 
be held accountable for strict liability or due care neg­
ligence; whether the defamed party should be allowed to 
collect general, special, or exemplary damages; whether a 
retraction statute is applicable; or whether yet additional 
legal categories may apply.
A significant number of legal writers have found these 
rigid distinctions and categories inappropriate for radio
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and television.(1) To remedy the situation they have called 
for the establishment of a new tort which would completely 
overhaul the rules of defamation applicable to radio and 
television.(2) a 1962 Georgia Appellate Court in American 
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson made rec­
ognizable progress toward this goal by holding that defama­
tion by radio or television falls into a new category, 
defamacast, and is actionable per se.(2) Although that 
decision was only a beginning of what needs to be done, it 
established a precedent from which courts and legislators 
may be stimulated to establish specific criteria for def­
amation by broadcast. Thus, as Henry the VII established 
the law of libel with the advent of the printing press,(4) 
courts and legislators today should establish the law of 
defamacast to account for the unique aspects of radio and 
television.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to provide a theoretical 
definition of defamacast (as a new tort) to assist broad­
casters in understanding present broadcast defamation laws, 
and to provide useful information and suggestions for the 
formulation of new defamacast laws. The study will rec­
ognize defamacast as a new tort, distinct from libel and 
slander, cognizant of the effects of radio and television, 
and extracted from applicable legal principles. Broad­
casters, jurists, legislators and the general public should 
benefit from a clear conceptual development of this con-
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fusing and irrational area of tort law.
Review of the Literature
Several doctoral dissertations have made contribu­
tions to this area of study. Joseph Keller's doctorate 
of law dissertation, "Federal Control of Defamation by 
Radio," from Georgetown University in 1935 presented the 
need and feasibility for a federal law of broadcast defam­
ation. Robert McMahon's "Federal Regulation of the Radio 
and Television Broadcast Industry in the United States, 
1957-59 with Special Reference to the Establishment and 
Operation of Workable Administration Standards" from Ohio 
State University in 1959 and William McDougald's "Federal 
Regulation of Political Broadcasting: A History and 
Analysis" from Ohio State University in 1964 considered 
the feasibility and practicality of federal regulations 
and interference. Robert Bliss analyzed the implications 
of the New York Times' case which extended the actual 
malice standard to reports concerning public officials in 
"Some Implications for Mass Communications of New York 
Times Company v. Sullivan" from the University of Iowa in 
1967. It should be noted, however, that with the exception 
of Joseph Keller's 1935 study, these studies have been 
primarily designed to interpret the meaning of the law 
rather than to evaluate the law and suggest change.
Several master's theses have contributed research con­
cerning the laws of broadcast defamation. In 1959
J x
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Eugene Brott at the University of Illinois summarized the 
"Statutes Concerning Broadcast Defamation." In 1960 
Robert Morgan at Boston University studied "Section 315 
of the Communications Act of 1934: An Overview of the 
Development of Political Broadcast Defamation." In 1962 
William Shilstone at Stanford University evaluated "Pri­
vacy and Privilege: How California Courts Have Defined 
and Limited the Right of Privacy." Of these studies, 
William Shilstone's, to a greater extent than the others, 
goes beyond interpretation of the law to suggest needed 
revisions. Unfortunately, the right of privacy is only 
remotely related to defamation by broadcast, and 
Mr. Shilstone's study is confined to suggestions for 
California. Thus, a critical evaluation of the laws of 
broadcast defamation, coupled with proposed innovations, 
will provide a fresh approach for research in this area.
Scope
A fictitious illustration of broadcast defamation in 
a 1964 Mercer Law Review comment reveals a few of the 
complexities in defamation by radio or television:
The popularity ratings of the television 
program continued to decline. The sponsors 
were insistent. They demanded a program 
capable of attracting the public interest 
and capturing the nationwide television 
audience. The emcee of the program made 
one last effort. He began his program by 
joking about a well-known personality. Then, 
warming to the subject, he began to tell 
derogatory stories about this individual.
Were they true? The emcee did not know nor 
did he care. But he did know that he had
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everything to gain and nothing to lose. If 
the maltreated person desired to rectify the 
situation, it would involve a lengthy court­
room procedure and the ambiguous and unpre­
dictable rules of defamation were on the 
defendant's side. Let him try to prove it!(5)
Although this illustration is not all-inclusive of the 
variables involved in broadcast defamation, it raises the 
following questions: Was a tort committed? If so, was it 
slander, libel, or defamacast? Should the maltreated person 
be required to prove damages or were the statements defam­
atory per se? Could gestures, vocal intonations, and 
camera shots be considered defamatory? Does a broadcaster 
assume strict liability or need he only exercise due care? 
These are some of the many questions which invariably are 
asked when defamation occurs by radio or television. This 
study will attempt to answer such questions through a 
theoretical construction of defamacast as a new tort.
Organization
The study is divided into three sections: (1) the
origin and development of slander and libel with applica­
tions to radio and television; (2) the extraction of 
applicable legal principles and explanation of the function 
of those principles; and (3) the implications of the 
theoretical concepts of defamacast as a new tort.
The first chapter will trace the development of slan­
der and libel with the following considerations: the 
origin of slander and libel, the slander-libel distinction, 
the application to radio and television, the reasons for
6
concern with our present broadcast defamation laws, and the 
suggestions for revamping of those laws.
The second chapter will provide a basis for the con­
struction of a theoretical definition of defamacast through 
explanations of the functions of applicable legal prin­
ciples. These legal principles which are inherent in the 
law of broadcast defamation frequently overlap and occasion­
ally conflict, making the extraction of certain workable 
principles a worthwhile task. Advantages and disadvantages 
of various approaches to the lav; will be considered.
The third chapter will construct a theoretical def­
inition of defamacast based upon the implicatory dimensions 
extracted in the second chapter. The new tort will be 
defined in terms of a concept with related lower level 
concepts, in the form of a model federal statute, and in 
the form of examples in a hypothetical situation.
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Definitions(6)
Absolute Privilege— An absolute privilege protects the
publisher or disseminator of defamatory imputations 
from liability without reference to his motives or 
the truth or falsity of the statement.
Contacts Approach— Determines which state provides the most 
contributing variables and applies that state's lav;.
Defamacast— Defamation by broadcast.
Defamation--The taking from one's reputation. The offense 
of injuring a person's character, fame, or reputation 
by false and malicious statements. The term includes 
both libel and slander.
Exemplary Damages--An increased award in view of aggravation 
of the injury by circumstances of violence, oppression, 
malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the 
part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the 
plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feel­
ings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of 
the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant 
for his evil behavior or to make an example of him.
General Damages— General damages are such as the law itself 
implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong 
complained of, for the reason that they are its im­
mediate, direct, and proximate result, or such as 
necessarily result from the injury, or such as did in 
fact result from the wrong, directly and proximately, 
and without reference to the special character, con­
dition, or circumstances of the plaintiff.
Lex Loci Delecti--The law of the place where a tort is 
committed.
Libel Per Quod— They are those expressions which are not 
actionable upon their face, but which become so by 
reason of the peculiar situation or occasion upon 
which the words are written.
Libel Per Se--A publication is rendered libelous per se
when words are of such a character that a presumption 
of law will arise therefrom that the plaintiff has 
been degraded in his reputation and has suffered 
damage.
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Negligence— The omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which 
ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the 
doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man 
would not do.
Qualified Privilege— A qualified or conditional privilege 
protects a publisher or disseminator from liability 
unless actual malice or wrongful intent is shown.
Reply— A right of reply permits an alledgedly defamed
individual to use the broadcasting facilities from 
which an imputation eminated concerning his reputa­
tion, to reply to the imputations.
Res Ipsa Loquitor— The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable 
presumption that the defendant was negligent, which 
arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury 
was in the defendant's exclusive control, and that 
the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen 
in absence of negligence.
Retraction Statement— A broadcasted statement which serves 
as a complete and unequivocal denial of the validity 
with regard to an imputation concerning an individual 
in a previous broadcast.
Single Publication Rule--Treats a defamatory broadcast as 
one publication whereby the plaintiff is allowed to 
plead and prove a general distribution of the imputa­
tion .
Slander Per Quod--Slanderous words which require proof of 
special damages.
Slander Per Se--Slanderous in itself. Words which are 
slanderous without proof of special damages.
Special Damages— Those which are the actual, but not the 
necessary, result of the injury complained of, and 
which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate 
consequence in the particular case, that is, by reason 
of special circumstances or conditions.
Strict Liability— Liability without fault. Case is one of 
"strict liability" when neither care nor negligence, 
neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor 
ignorance will save defendant.
Tort— A private or civil wrong or injury independent of con­
tract. Three elements of every tort action are: 
Existence of legal duty from defendant to plaintiff, 
breach of duty, and damage as proximate result.
CHAPTER 1
SLANDER AND LIBEL
FROM THE SOUND WAVE TO THE ELECTRON 
General Background
The law of defamation is concerned with the "taking 
from one's reputation" typically through injuries to "a 
person's character, fame, or reputation by false and 
malicious statements. 7 )  Defamation invades an individ­
ual's interests and good name in a relational manner, as 
the harm involves the opinions that others may have of the 
plaintiff.(8) "Speaking generally, the law recognizes in 
every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands 
in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to 
his discredit." (9) The tort necessitates publication of 
the defamatory matter to someone in addition to the plain­
tiff. Thus, derogatory and insulting remarks directed to 
the plaintiff may form a cause of action for "intentional 
infliction of mental suffering," but unless they are com­
municated to someone other than the defamed there can be no 
action for defamation.(10)
Defamation consists of the twin torts— slander and 
libel. In theory slander usually is oral,(H) while libel 
is written;(12) however, in practice each has developed
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additional rules and distinctions which have become in­
creasingly contradictory and anomalous. (13) As Prosser 
notes,
The explanation is in part one of historical 
accident and survival, in part one of the 
conflict of opposing ideas of policy in which 
our traditional notions of freedom of expres­
sion have collided violently with sympathy for 
the victim traduced and indignation at the 
maligning tongue.(14)
Many of these conflicting rules and irrational distinctions 
are explainable only in light of their historical develop­
ment.
Origin of Slander and Libel 
As long ago as the Anglo Saxon period, remedies for 
defamation existed.(I5) Before the sixteenth century, ac­
tions for defamation were tried in the local Seignorial 
courts with common law courts taking no jurisdiction.(16) 
After the local Seignorial courts lost their influence, the 
ecclesiastical courts accepted jurisdiction and regarded 
defamation as a sin punishable by penance.(17) As these 
courts in turn lost their power, tort actions for slander 
reverted back to the common law courts in a slow, but steady 
process. Jurisdictional squabbles between the two tribunals 
caused common lav/ courts to hold that unless "temporal" 
damage could be proved, defamation was a "spiritual" matter 
which should be left to the church.(18) Eventually, the 
common law courts received jurisdiction over slander; how­
ever, the judges became "annoyed and dismayed"(19) by the
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unexpected flood of actions and established rigid dis­
tinctions in their efforts to hedge the remedy.
Court of Star Chamber
With the introduction of the printing press, civil 
actions for defamation became inadequate to suppress sedi­
tious religious and political publications.(20) As a 
result Henry the VII created the Court of Star Chamber 
to punish the new crime of libel. The Star Chamber was a 
criminal court of equity made up of the highest officers in 
the state with jurisdiction over political and eventually 
non-political libels(21) for the purpose of providing a 
legal remedy to avoid duels and disturbances of the 
peace.(22) Although the Star Chamber was abolished in 
1640, (23) jurisdiction passed to the common law courts with 
the distinction between oral and written defamation still 
intact.(24)
Thorely v. Lord Kerry
Libel was officially declared as a tort by the 1670 
King v. Lake case in which the plaintiff alledged that a 
petition prepared by King was "stuffed with illegal asser­
tions, ineptitudes, and solecisms."(25) The court held that 
"although such general words spoken once without writing 
or publishing them would not be actionable, yet here, they 
being writ and published which contains more malice than if 
it had been spoken, they are actionable." In Harman v.
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Delany the court added to this reasoning by noting that 
a "Word published in writing will be actionable— which 
would not be so from a bare speaking of the words, be­
cause libel perpetuates and dispenses the scandal."(26)
The distinctions between slander and libel were firmly 
welded to the law by the case of Thorely v. Lord Kerry 
in 1812, in which Sir James Mansfield recognized the 
established, yet indefensible distinction in these words:
"if the matter were for the first time decided this day,
I should have no hesitation in saying that no action could 
be maintained for written scandal which could not be main­
tained for the words if they had been spoken."(27) Hence, 
the distinction between slander and libel was recognized 
as indefensible in the 19th century; however, it had al­
ready been established beyond repudiation in the law of 
defamation.
Slander-libel Distinction
In today's courts, slander and libel are distinguished 
primarily for the purpose of determining the amount of 
evidence necessary to prove the plaintiff's claim. Slander 
per se and libel per se do not require the plaintiff to 
prove special or actual damages as these damages are assumed. 
Slander per quod and libel per quod, however, usually re­




Slander requires that actual damages be proved with 
certain exceptions: the imputation of a crime; the impu­
tation of a loathsome disease; imputations affecting the 
plaintiff in his trade, business, profession, or office; 
and in most jurisdictions, imputation of unchastity con­
cerning a woman.(28) These categories of slander require 
no proof of actual harm to the reputation of the plaintiff, 
but rather such harm is presumed.
Imputation of a Crime. An imputation of a crime may 
occur through the accusation that a person is guilty of 
a crime subject to corporal punishment in England,(29) with 
the additional requirement that it be subject to indictment 
in the United States, (30) an<g that the offense involve an 
"infamous" or "disgraceful" punishment in jurisdictions 
such as Hew York. (31) Most jurisdictions now require that 
the crime be one which involves "moral turpitude."(32) As 
Prosser notes, not every assault and battery involves 
"moral turpitude," but the accusation that the plaintiff 
beat his mother does.(33) Thus, the courts appear to be 
moving toward a standard of "major social disgrace"(34) 
where even the exact crime need not be identified:(35) 
words such as "thief,"(36) "pimp,"(37) and "bootlegger"(38) 
have been held to be sufficient imputations of a crime.
Imputation of a Loathsome Disease. An imputation of 
a loathsome disease may cause a person to be excluded from
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society.(39) For this reason courts recognized accusations 
of venereal disease (4°) and leprosy(41) as especially 
damaging to one's reputation. On the other hand, a disease 
such as smallpox was recognized as resulting in either re­
covery or death, and therefore would not result in the 
same social avoidance of one who had recovered from the 
disease.(42) For this reason smallpox, insanity,(43) 
tuberculosis,(44) and many other communicable diseases are 
not included. Similarly, allegations that one has had 
venereal disease in the past would require proof of actual 
harm for damages to be awarded.(45)
Imputation Affecting the Plaintiff in His Trade. Pro­
vided that the plaintiff is engaged or about to be engaged 
in a business or trade,(46) words which harm the plaintiff 
in regard to his job are actionable without proof of damage. 
Thus it is actionable without proof of damage to allege that 
a physician is a butcher,(47) that an attorney is a shys­
ter, (48) that a school teacher is guilty of improper con­
duct with his pupils,(49) or that a chauffeur is habitually 
drinking.(50) jn a contrary vein, it has been held not to 
be actionable without proof of damage to allege that a 
physician has committed adultery,(51) that an attorney has 
lost thousands of dollars,(52) or that a dancing teacher 
has been drunk(53) since in these instances the plaintiff 
might not be harmed in his job.
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Imputation of Unchastity Concerning a Woman. Most 
courts have held that "imputation of unchastity to a woman 
is actionable without proof of damage, without regard to 
whether it charges a crime."(54) This rule has never been 
applied to a man since the damage to his reputation would 
not be as great;(55) however, several courts have held that 
accusations of unchastity to either sex is equivalent to 
a charge of fornication or adultery which involves moral 
turpitude.(56) Prosser notes that although the question 
has not arisen, "it appears very likely ... that the impu­
tation of homosexuality to either sex would be held to con­
stitute a fifth category, actionable without proof of dam­
age. "
Slander Per Quod
Slanderous words which do not fit into one of these 
four categories are slanderous per quod, not slanderous in 
and of themselves, and require proof of actual (special) 
damages. Special damages refer to definite, concrete, and 
specific proof of injury(57) usually requiring an additional 
proof of pecuniary loss.(58) Accusations that a plaintiff 
is a bastard,(59) a damned liar,(50) a Communist,(51) or 
that he wets in his bed(52) will provide a cause of action 
through proof of a pecuniary loss. Once the cause of action 
has been brought by the plaintiff, additional damages may 
be collected for injuries to the plaintiff's reputation,(55) 
wounded feelings and humiliation,(54) resulting physical
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illness and pain, (65) and even future damages of this 
nature.(66) Damages are usually limited to those which 
are reasonably foreseeable as the "proximate cause" of 
the accusation.(67) Hence, unless the slanderous words 
fit into one of the four slander per se categories, actual 
damages must be pleaded and proved.
Libel Per Se and Per Quod
Libelous words as determined by the common law courts 
were actionable without the necessity of pleading or prov­
ing damages suffered by the plaintiff. Such damage was 
assumed from the publication of the libel.(68) por this 
reason the majority of jurisdictions do not require that 
damages be proved where the "publication is defamatory 
upon its face" (libel per se);(69) however, in cases where 
extrinsic facts are needed to interpret the meaning of the 
words (libel per quod), the courts have held that this 
libel should be treated like slander.(70)
Expansion of Slander and Libel
From the preceding development of the distinctions 
between slander and libel it can be seen that the differ­
ence between the two torts involves more than oral and 
written defamation, but rather encompasses the entire spec­
trum of evidence requirements in a defamation suit. At 
first, these distinctions had an obvious advantage for 
simplicity and ease of application; however, eventually 
the common law encountered new modes of defamation,
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thereby forcing slander and libel to expand. Thus, libel 
was found in pictures,(71) signs,(72) statues;(73) and 
burning(74) or hanging(75) the plaintiff in effigy, 
building a gibbet in front of his house,(76) and dis­
honoring his valid check.(77) one court held that to 
hang a lantern at the front door of a home of a respect­
able woman was libel.(78) Similarily, defamatory gestures 
of a deaf mute were considered slander,(79) while oral 
communication reduced to writing as stenographic dicta­
tions (80) ancj telegrams (SI) was considered libel.
Search for a Test
This expansion of the law to include more than face 
to face talking for slander and more than writing and 
printing for libel invalidated the traditional oral- 
written distinction. Scholars began looking for a new 
basis of distinction and for a time concluded that libel 
was communicated by sight and slander by sound.(82) with 
the realization that the sight-sound test was insuf­
ficient, (83) legal theorists moved toward the "permanency 
of form" (84) ancj "magnitude of the potential harm" (85) 
standards.
The permanency of form distinction is based on the 
durability of the imputation and its capacity for easy 
dissemination. As Justice Cardozo noted in Qstrowe v.
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Lee,
Many things that are defamatory may be said 
with impunity through the medium of speech.
Not so, however, when speech is caught upon 
the wing and transmitted into print. What 
gives the sting to the writing is its perma­
nence of form. The spoken word dissolves, 
but the written one abides and perpetuates 
the scandal.(86)
Several legal theorists have contended that the enormous 
potential harm of imputations made on radio and television 
may provide an impression in the mind of an audience member 
as permanent as that gained from a printed page and in no 
way lessened by a lack of durability.(87)
Application to Radio and Television 
While theorists were establishing the various legal 
tests, the radio and television industries created prob­
lems for courts(88) to adapt these distinctions to the 
media. Direct application of either the sight and sound 
or the permanency criteria is futile. Radio can reach an 
audience of millions with a defamatory remark through 
words conveyed by a single voice, and this voice may or 
may not be embodied in a permanent form.(89) por example, 
three types of programs may include defamation: (1) a
program from a script; (2) a program from a script where 
a performer interjects an extemporaneous defamatory remark; 
and (3) a spontaneous "live" program such as an interview 
whereby defamation is uttered extemporaneously.(90) in 
addition, each of these may or may not be recorded. There 
is a difference between a spontaneous defamatory remark
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on a "live” broadcast and the same remark recorded and 
broadcasted later. As could be expected, decisions have 
not been consistent.(91)
Program from a Script
Defamatory remarks read from a script have in most 
cases been considered as libel by the courts. Hartman v. 
Winchell(92) held such defamatory utterances to be libel 
on the basis of "permanence of form," rejecting the argu­
ment that the audience did not know the words were being 
read from a script. In the concurring opinion for this 
case Judge Fuld attempted to open the door for a broader 
base:
If the base of liability for defamation is to 
be broadened in the case of radio broadcasting, 
justification should be sought . . .  in a frank 
recognition that sound policy requires such a 
result . . . That defamation by radio in the
absence of script or transcription, lacks the 
measure of durability possessed by written 
libel in no wise lessens its capacity for harm. 
Since the element of damage is, historically, 
the basis of common-law action for defamation 
and since it is reasonable to preserve damage 
from the nature of the medium employed, when 
a slander is broadcast by radio as when pub­
lished by writing, both logic and policy point 
to the conclusion that defamation by radio 
should be actionable per se.(93)
Although television defamation should have logically 
developed this broader base by analogy to motion pic­
tures, (94) such was not the case. In Remington v. Bentley 
the court rejected application of motion picture standards 
and refused to categorize such defamation as libel:
20
I feel that the additional factor of pic­
torial representation along with the statements 
adds no more to the form of defamation than 
would the circumstance of a great audience in 
a stadium or the like listening to the spoken 
word. I adopt this view keeping in mind and 
in spite of the fact that defamation in motion 
pictures has been treated as libel.(95)
The court in Landou v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.(96) took a contrary view; however, its decision was
based upon defamatory remarks from a prepared script.
Extemporaneous Remark
Defamatory remarks delivered extemporaneously provided
difficulty for the courts, not only in terms of conflicting
decisions, but in justification for their application of
the distinctions. Many courts held extemporaneous remarks
broadcast by radio to be slander based upon a lack of
"permanence of form."(97) in Irwin v. Ashurst, however,
the court concluded that such new media could be used as
. . . a most powerful agency for the defamation
of character . . . [A]ssume that a person writes
a speech of a defamatory nature and, after com­
mitting the same to memory, speaks over the air 
without referring to his manuscript. Would such 
be held slander and not libel? The person v/ho 
hears the defamatory material over the air ordin­
arily does not knov; whether or not the speaker 
is reading from a manuscript. Furthermore, what 
difference does it make to such a person, so far 
as the effect is concerned?(98)
The initial view of the courts regarding televised 
extemporaneous remarks followed the precedent set by the 
radio cases and found such defamation to be slander.(99) 
This view prevailed until Shor v. Billingsley(100) rejected
the logic of the earlier cases. In this case the plain­
tiff brought an action for defamation based upon remarks 
made by Sherman Billingsley, operator of the Stork res­
taurant, on his nationally televised "Stork Club Show" in 
which he said of his competitor Toots Shor, operator of 
the Toots Shor Restaurant: "I wish I had as much money as 
he owes." Justice Hecht of the Supreme Court of New York 
held that this defamatory broadcast should be treated as 
libel rather than slander, even though it was not read 
from a script. Justice Hecht based his reasoning upon the 
capacity for harm doctrine rather than "permanence of form."
Basis of Liability
The confusion is further complicated by the conflict 
between those who believe that defamation by broadcast 
should incur the same liabilities as the press (strict 
liability)(101) and those who think it should be favored 
by the law (due care negligence).(102)
Strict Liability. Sorenson v. Wood held a radio 
station liable for defamatory remarks read from a manu­
script, stating simply, "The underlying basis for liabil­
ity is libel, and not negligent conduct."(103) jn a con­
trasting decision the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (104) held 
that the law of defamation in that state requires only 
that a broadcaster exercise a high standard of care, with 
no imposition of liability without fault. These two cases
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exemplify the underlying question which the courts have 
been unable to resolve: Should the traditional law of 
defamation (strict liability) or the law of negligence 
be the basis of liability for broadcast defamation cases? 
Newspaper publishers are subjected to strict liability and 
many legal theorists would apply the same extent of liabil­
ity to broadcasters.(105)
The analogy between newspaper publishers and broad­
casters was further intertwined in Coffey v. Midland 
Broadcasting Co.:
The (newspaper) prints the libel on paper 
and broadcasts it to the reading world. The 
owner of the radio station "prints" the libel 
on a different medium just as widely or even 
more widely "read."(105)
The court argued that a broadcaster should assume the same 
liability for defamation outside of its control as a news­
paper publisher assumes from defamation slipping by proof­
readers. A multitude of writers have supported strict 
liability for broadcasters based on similar lines of 
reasoning.(107)
Negligence. Alarmed by potential imposition of strict 
liability, the National Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters (NARTB), now known as the National Association 
of Broadcasters (NAB), urged state legislators to create 
laws establishing lack of due care as the basis for liabil­
ity. (108) n .A.B. distributed a model statute to encourage 
adoption of statutes favorable to its professional members.
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Section 1 of the model statute provided for no liability
. . . unless it shall be alledged and proved
by the complaining party, that such owner, 
licensee, operator, or such agent or employee, 
has failed to exercise due care to prevent 
the publication or utterance of such statement 
in such broadcast.
Section 2 relieved the broadcaster from liability "for 
any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of 
such station or network of stations by or on behalf of any 
candidate for public office." Section 3 allowed the plain­
tiff to collect "only such actual damages as he has al­
ledged and proved." (109)
State legislators reacted favorably to N.A.B.'s sug­
gestions with the result that at least twenty-four states 
adopted statues paralleling section 1; (HO) twenty-three 
followed the model in regard to section and four
states enacted section 3. Still other states have
somewhat modified variations of particular sections.(H3)
In addition, seven states have enacted statutes which 
permit defamatory statements to be retracted. ( ^
Reasons for Concern
There are several reasons for concern with the present 
state of broadcast defamation laws: (1) The laws of
broadcast defamation vary from state to state contributing 
to conflict of laws. (2) The slander-libel distinctions 
as applied to radio and television result in grave ineq­
uities and impractical adaptations. (3) Arbitrary lines 
drawn between actionable and non-actionable words destroy
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the balance between free speech and the rights of the in­
dividual traduced. (4) Present standards of liability 
for broadcast defamation are unacceptable. (5) Media 
injuries to personality are placed in a very low level 
category of consideration. (6) The law neglects consid­
eration of potentially harmful aspects of radio and tele­
vised communications. Each of the reasons for concern 
cites a major inadequacy inherent in our present laws.
These inadequacies should be curbed, and where possible, 
eliminated.
Conflict of Laws
The laws of defamation vary between states, but broad­
casts cross state lines. State boundaries are no barrier 
to a broadcast. A court may hold that the final act of 
your broadcast occurred in a receiving set a thousand miles 
away, rather than in the studio.(H5) Because of the con­
flict of laws, various legal consequences may result from 
multi-state broadcast defamation.
It can be seen that no semblance of uniformity can be 
found in the various approaches which the courts have de­
vised in attempting to solve the choice of law problems 
inherent in multi-state defamation situations. The sub­
stantive defamation laws vary greatly from state to state 
and seem always to be changing. (116)
Inappropriate Distinctions
The slander-libel, distinctions as applied to radio
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and television result in grave inequities and impractical 
adaptations. A clear inequity exists in the lav/ when it 
may be actionable for a defendant to write that a plain­
tiff is a "damned liar" on a post card, (117) which is read 
by a single person, but it may not be actionable if the same 
statement is uttered extemporaneously over television to a 
million viewers. For the lesser of the two evils, publica­
tion by a third person reading a post card, to receive the 
brunt of the law of libel appears inequitable and unjusti­
fied. At the same time, for the obviously more serious 
matter to be placed in a less serious slander category ap­
pears even more disheartening, especially if that category 
is slander per quod requiring the plaintiff to prove actual 
damages.
In their effort to arrive at just decisions and avoid 
inequities, the courts have experienced difficulty. Many 
courts have based their decisions not on the facts of the 
case or the gravity of harm, but on legal precedents, state 
statutes, and federal law; thereby upholding the slander- 
libel distinctions, which may or may not produce a just 
result in a particular case. Not all courts, however, have 
been blindly led down the "tunnels of distinction"(H8) for 
several courts have considered broadcast defamation as nei­
ther slander or libel,(H9) some courts have reversed 
precedent for a more equitable result, (120) ancj still others 
have avoided the issue through various means.(121)
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Actionable and Non-actionable Words
Arbitrary lines draiwn between actionable and non-
actionable words destroy the balance between free speech
and the rights of an individual traduced. The law holds
that certain words are defamatory while others are not,
thereby encouraging the development of distinctions and
categories. These distinctions and categories destroy the
needed balance between free expression and the right to be
free from defamatory imputations. As Judge I. Skelly Wright
stated in the Texas Law Review,
In drawing a line between permissible and imper­
missible speech, some permissible speech will 
be restricted. The speaker, lest he cross over 
the line through momentary misjudgment, will 
tend to keep a safe distance from the dividing 
mark, and where the line is not, and cannot be, 
clearly drawn, the speaker will be even more 
cautious. One steers clear of a barbed wire 
fence, but he stays even farther away if he is 
not sure exactly where the fence is.(122)
Hence, the law might do better to delay judgment of whether
a word is defamatory or not for determination in each case.
Standards of Liability
Present standards of liability for broadcast defamation 
are unacceptable. Strict liability places an undue burden 
upon the broadcasters. The negligence standard disregards 
hardships suffered by the plaintiff. The "permanence of 
form" test fails to comprehend the effects of the defama­
tion, considering rather the permanence of its form, while 
the "capacity for harm" test looks adversely upon broad­
casting simply because of its power when in fact an in-
dividual may not have been harmed.
Strict Liability. Jurisdictions which follow the 
strict liability theory subject their broadcasters to an 
unnecessary degree of control. Broadcasters cannot be 
expected to control their dissemination of information to 
the point where defamatory remarks will not occur, lest 
valuable information may be lost through too close scrutiny. 
In addition, as a practical matter a broadcaster is not 
always in a position to know what is going to be said, nor 
is it usually possible for the broadcaster to "close off 
a broadcast when it appears that defamatory matter is being 
published."(123) Thus, jurisdictions which follow the strict 
liability standard— drawing analogies to newspaper publica- 
tions--restrict the free dissemination of information and 
place broadcasters in an untenable position.
Negligence. The due care negligence standard shifts 
the basis of liability too far in the other direction, dis­
regarding possible hardships suffered by the plaintiff. As 
George I. Van Os noted in the Houston Law Review;
It is entirely possible that a defamation be 
broadcast without any negligence attaching to 
the operators or broadcasters, and the defama­
tory statement, benefit the station through 
increased audience appeal or product appeal.
The plaintiff would suffer injury to his 
reputation but would be unable to be remuner­
ated due to the broadcaster's lack of negli­
gence. (124)
Thus, in this hypothetical example, not only did the plain­
tiff suffer a hardship for which he will not be appro-
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priately remunerated, but the defendant actually benefited 
from the defamation. To allow this result suggests that 
justice submit itself to media power.
Permanence of Form. As a further consideration, the 
application of the "permanence of form" and the "capacity 
for harm" standards fails to provide a sound basis for li­
ability. The "permanence of form" standard argues that 
defamatory material read from a script should be considered 
as libel. This criterion completely disregards the effect 
of the broadcast and bases liability upon material of a 
permanent nature. An audience may not know nor care that 
material is being read from a script and the capacity for 
harm will certainly not increase because the material was 
read from a script as opposed to being expressed extempor­
aneously .
Capacity for Harm. Although the "capacity for harm" 
should be considered for the purpose of formulating theories, 
it should not be a theory of liability in itself. Liability 
should be based upon an actual harm in a particular case 
based upon some proof of damage rather than an imputation 
of harm based on the capacity of a given media to produce 
such harm.
Media Injuries to Personality
Media injuries to personality are placed in a very low 
level category of consideration. As one writer noted,
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"the Washington Post, Station WCBS-TV, and Time magazine 
represent clusters of power quite as awesome as the Defense 
Department, American Telephone and Telegraph, and General 
Motors."(125) it cannot be denied that the function of 
the courts should be to assure that victims of defamatory 
imputations receive just compensation from the "media 
powers." The degree of concern for the individual traduced 
should be increased from the point of view of the courts 
to encourage "the maximum dissemination of information" 
while " . . .  helping to protect those injured by over- 
zealous communication."(126)
Relevant Distinctions. The "real" distinctions should 
establish differences between entertainment and news, injury 
and non-injury, fault and lack of fault. In regard to the 
distinction between entertainment and news, Marshal S. Sharpo, 
associate professor of lav/ at the University of Texas, con­
tends that
When a medium creates idle curiosity simply 
to satisfy it; when it advertises entities not 
pressed by the exigencies of the moment merely 
to get customers to buy or to view, then the 
very confusion of "entertainment" with "news" 
would imply that the entrepeneurial nature of 
the medium must be taken into consideration in 
formulating legal standards governing injury to 
personality.(127)
Thus, it is readily apparent that in the case of defamation 
occuring through entertainment as opposed to "hard" news, 
a broadcaster should logically be required to compensate
the defamed individual.
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A further distinction might be drawn between injury 
and non-injury. For example, it is conceivable that one 
individual may be severely harmed by a particular word or 
statement, whereas another individual may not be affected 
by that identical word or statement. For this reason li­
ability should not be based upon the "manner in which the 
defamatory statement is communicated"(128) or some other 
irrational distinction; but rather, the basis of liability 
should be the actual harm done to the individual. The 
courts should, therefore, give more consideration to matters 
such as "the plaintiff lost every friend he had" and less 
to "the defendant read the imputation from a script."
In some cases a distinction between fault or lack of 
fault may be needed to determine negligence (or lack of 
negligence) on the part of the defendant. Such a dis­
tinction would be more acceptable than an arbitrary one 
between slander and libel or their legal derivations.
Neglected Aspects of the Law
The law neglects consideration of potentially harmful 
aspects of radio and televised communications: (1) Dif­
ferences in appeal by the various media are not usually con­
sidered by the courts. (2) Televised non-verbal communica­
tions may be defamatory. (3) Technical manipulations by 
radio and television stations may cause or contribute to 
defamation.
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Differences in the Various Media. In regard to the
different properties and appeals of different media,
Harvey J. Levin, author of Broadcast Regulation and Joint
Ownership of Media, noted that
These media have diverse appeals--to eye (in words 
and pictures), to ear (in words and sound effects), 
and to eye and ear combined. Other differences can 
be defined in terms of the degree to which a medium 
is space-organized (newspapers), time-organized 
(radio), or time-and-space organized (movies and 
television). Still other differences exist in the 
degree to which any medium facilitates social 
participation (movies ranking first and newspapers 
last); a medium's speed (radio and television first 
and movies last); and its permanence (movies ranking 
first, newspapers next, and radio and television 
last).(129)
These different properties and appeals, especially regarding 
radio and television, have been rarely considered by the 
courts.
Non-verbal Communications. The problem is especially 
acute with regard to non-verbal communication (the study 
of kinesics, proxemics, and paralinguistics) which may be 
as defamatory as any verbal utterance. Scholars of kinesics, 
the study of bodily movement and its resultant meaning, 
believe that words express at most only thirty-five per 
cent of what people wish to convey. (130) An authority on 
kinesics, Ray L. Birdwhistell, observes: "Man is a multi- 
sensorial being. Occasionaly, he verbalizes."(131) Prox­
emics ( the study of social distance and spatial relation­
ships) , paralinguistics (the study of vocal variations), 
and kinesics permit the communication of meanings which may
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be defamatory in themselves or may simply contribute or 
distract from a verbal imputation. Thus, raised eyebrows, 
rolling eyes, obscene gestures, cringing, unreasonable 
distances between people, and vocal intonations may all be 
contributing factors to a defamatory imputation over tele­
vision, and in a rare instance could be defamatory without 
words. The courts should therefore provide compensation 
for individuals harmed by televised, defamatory non-verbal 
communications.
Technical Manipulations. Through manipulated camera
shots, color tones, and program arrangements, broadcasters
can damage an individual's reputation either intentionally
or non-intentionally. A simple matter such as varying
the focal length of the lens used and the subject- 
to-camera distance . . . (may produce) changes
in perspective. In the 9 mm shot, the nose is 
elongated and the ears seem to be far back. The 
100 mm shot gives us a flatter perspective than 
the 17 mm shot. In the 100 shot, the ears appear 
to be much closer to the front of the face, and 
the chin seems smaller.(132)
Color tones may also be manipulated to achieve various ef­
fects :
That there is an emotional content associated with 
color becomes obvious when we think of such terms 
as "warm beige," sickening yellow," and "shocking 
pink."(133)
. . . language, by itself, can only express an
experienced emotion while the visual may provide 
the emotion itself.(134)
Even the arrangement of materials within programs, as well 
as materials preceding and following a given program, may
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contribute to, and possibly cause defamatory imputations.
Approach to Reform of the Law 
Based upon the growing concern for reform of broadcast 
defamation laws, several theorists have called for the 
creation of a new tort. Speculation in this regard cul­
minated in 1962 when a Georgia Appellate Court in American 
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson(135) held 
that defamation by radio and television falls into a new 
category— defamacast--and is actionable per se. In this 
case the plaintiff, one of two federal prison guards who 
accompanied Alphonce Capone from Atlanta Federal Prison to 
Alcatraz Federal Prison in 1934, brought an action against 
the producer of a television show, "The Untouchables." The 
program showed one of the guards accepting a bribe from 
Capone, an event which plaintiff contended was false. In 
holding that defamation by radio and television falls into 
a new category, the court reasoned that common law must be 
revamped to avoid usage of the slander-libel dichotomy.
In regard to this dichotomy, the court noted that
. . . whatever the rationale, we think the
distinction bears very little relationship 
to the realities of the problem. After all, 
the listener or viewer cares little and 
often does not know whether a script is 
being used. Nor does the use of a script 
have any relationship to the broadcasters 
ability to harm.(136)
It therefore appears that the court believed that the slander- 
libel distinction has outlived its usefulness regarding 
the realities of the problems involved in broadcast defama-
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tion. The court further contended that the law must change
to adapt to the needs of our times.(137)
The novelty of the complaint is no objection 
when an injury recognized by the law is shown 
to have been inflicted on the plaintiff. In 
such case, although there be no precedent, the 
common law will judge according to the law of 
nature and the public good.(138)
It is interesting to note that the court did not feel com­
pelled to wait for legislation on the matter, as it said,
Some courts have held that the relief here sought 
can be granted only by legislation, and that in 
the absence of such legislation [that courts are 
without power to grant it. Ursurpation of the 
legislation by the courts is never justified, and 
will not be tolerated. But, this fundamental 
principle is not upheld by refusal of the judiciary 
to discharge to the limit of its authority the 
functions imposed upon it by the Constitution, 
upon the excuse further legislation is necessary.
Hence, this court provided the impetus for development of a
new tort.
Although there are means of remodeling the law short of 
developing a new tort, this writer will extract principles 
of law which should be included in the formulation of a new 
tort. The writer will seek to indicate common variables, 
dimensions and lower level concepts, needed for construction 
of the new tort. The theoretical construction of the new 
tort, termed defamacast for the purpose of this thesis, will 
offer information, analysis, and theory common to several 
approaches for reform of law.
CHAPTER II
BROADCAST DEFAMATION
EXPLICATION OF APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
General Background
The clearest historical analogy Where a written anal­
ysis influenced the construction of a new tort occured 
when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis recognized a 
"right of privacy" in a famous 1890 Harvard Law Review 
article.(140) This right, and the accompanying new tort, 
now exist in at least thirty-four states.(141) in the 
same manner, several legal writers(142) have already 
called for a new tort to cover actions for broadcast def­
amation. It seems to follow, then, that an effort should 
be made to extract applicable rules and privileges from the 
present law of defamation and apply them toward construction 
of a new tort. Explication of legal principles concerning 
multi-state defamation, standards of liability, determin­
ation of damages, and defenses against charges of defamation 
will provide a basis for construction of this new tort.
Multi-state Defamation
When a defamatory utterance is made over radio and 
television in one state, it will invariably reach a mul­
titude of eyes and ears in other states. This multi-state
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defamation causes conflict of law problems for the courts to 
settle and for victims whose right to compensation fluc­
tuates "in a haphazard and arbitrary fashion according to 
the particular position which each state of impact has 
taken on the scope and extent of broadcaster liability."(143)
Conflict of Laws
Common law provided that every communication of a li­
belous statement constituted a separate cause of action.(144) 
Since it would not be feasible to allow separate causes of 
action in broadcast defamation cases, for there could be 
millions of actions against one defendant, the courts have 
suggested three possible alternatives: lex loci delecti 
(the law of the place where a tort is committed) , (145) the 
contacts approach (determining which state provided the 
most contributing variables) , (146) and the single publica­
tions rule (each publication gives rise to one cause of 
action).(147)
Lex Loci Delecti. In Hartman v. Time, Inc., (148) a 
plaintiff alleged that he had been libelled in forty-eight 
states in an issue of Time magazine. The court held that 
the single publications rule could not cross state lines and 
applied a multiple publications choice of law rule in those 
states which retained that doctrine. This interpretation 
placed a tremendous strain on the jury to apply the laws 
of forty-nine jurisdictions (with the District of Columbia)
to this single multi-state defamation. Thus, although the 
lex loci delecti has been a standard conflicts approach 
with regard to most interstate tort situations,(1^9) it 
certainly is undesirable for broadcast defamation cases 
where there might be fifty-one places of simultaneous im­
pact.
Contacts Approach. In Dale System, Inc. v. General 
Teleradio, (150) the court listed five "dominant contacts": 
the forum, the place of last event, the point of origina­
tion, the state of principal circulation, and the plain­
tiff's domicile. The court held that three of the five 
contacts were found in New York and therefore applied 
New York law. In Kemart Corp. v. Printing Research Labora­
tories, Inc. , (151) the court held that two "dominant con­
tacts" were in California and applied California law. In 
most situations this approach is superior to lex loci 
delecti for it recognizes the applicable variables and 
attempts to work with them. (152) it remains unsatisfactory, 
however, in that it does not engender uniformity or pre­
dictability, nor can it consider the vast array of variables 
applicable to radio and television.(153)
Single Publication Rule. In cases involving venue or 
or the statute of limitations, the majority of American 
courts have adopted the "single publication rule" which 
treats a defamatory broadcast as one publication whereby the 
plaintiff is permitted to plead and prove a general dis-
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tribution of the libel as evidence of damage. (154) The
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws have adopted this rule
in the Uniform Single Publications Act which six states
have enacted. (155) Section 1 of this act provides that
Wo person shall have more than one cause of 
action for damages for libel or slander . . .
of a broadcast over radio or television. Re­
covery in any such action shall include all 
damages for any such tort suffered by the 
plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
Section 2 provides that
A judgement in any jurisdiction for or against 
the plaintiff upon the substantive merits of 
any action for damages founded upon a single 
publication or exhibition or utterance des­
cribed in Section 1 shall bar any other action 
for damages by the same plaintiff against the 
same defendant founded upon the same publica­
tion or exhibition or utterance.
If the "single publication rule" were followed in all states,
the choice and conflict of law problems would be greatly
diminished.
Federal Law
Our national scheme of radio and television publication 
requires a federal law of broadcast defamation. A federal 
law would have three potential advantages over our present 
conglomeration of state laws. First, the law could produce 
uniformity among the states providing "some degree of cer­
tainty to both the publisher and his libel victim."(156) 
Second, a national law could "establish ground rules" and 
provide a "simplified procedural framework for their enforce­
ment." (1^) Third, a federal law could abolish the confused
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mass of inappropriate distinctions in the present law.(158)
This approach would be justified by three separate 
constitutional provisions,(159) by the national character 
of broadcast defamation, and by the practical adaptations 
of such a law. In this manner Congress could create a 
federal cause of action leaving the actual responsibility 
of molding a federal common law to the courts; or even 
better, Congress could develop rules and privileges to be 
applied by the courts.
Basis of Liability
Whether a broadcaster should be considered as a pub­
lisher or a disseminator, has not been resolved by the 
courts. For this reason the courts are still troubled by 
two theories of liability: strict liability in the case 
of a publisher and due care negligence in the case of a 
disseminator.
Broadcaster as Publisher
It has been established that in order for defamation 
to occur, there must be "publication,"(160) which means 
that the defamatory imputation must be communicated to 
someone other than the defamed. Publication may be oral, 
written, or even conveyed by gestures or the exhibition of 
a picture or statue. (161) Every repetition of the defama­
tion is a publication in itself; (162) and usually, every 
one who takes part in the defamation is charged with pub­
lication. (163) There may even be an affirmative duty to
remove a publication made by another. (164) The publisher 
of defamation, whether libel(165) or slander, (166) ps 
strictly liable regardless of whether he originated it.
The majority of jurisdictions lean toward holding broad­
casters accountable as publishers.(167)
Broadcaster as Disseminator
A "disseminator," on the other hand, merely circulates 
defamatory materials already communicated to another. (168) 
The proprietor of a bookstore or newspaper stand distributes 
or disseminates books and periodicals. In a close analogy 
to the bookstore, the broadcaster distributes and dissem­
inates information, which is often out of his immediate con­
trol and may not be detected. As Professor Francis Bohlen 
stated in the Harvard Law Review, it
would seem that justice would be done and the 
good reputation of all mankind given sufficient 
protection by treating the broadcaster as a 
disseminator rather than publisher of the def­
amatory interpolation.(169)
Professor Bohlen suggested that the broadcaster should be 
liable only if he fails to exercise care to insure "that no 
scandalmonger should take advantage of its facilities to 
speak over its microphone matter defamatory of other per­
sons. "(170) The American Lav/ Institute's Restatement of 
Torts adds that a broadcaster is "at least liable" for dis­
semination of defamation where he fails to exercise due care 
to prevent publication.(171)
American Law Institute's Restatement
In their quest to restate the law of defamation ap­
plicable to radio and television, the American Law Institute 
recognized three approaches: (1) to prescribe liability
equal to that of a newspaper and periodical publisher or 
strict liability; (2) to establish a duty of care for 
broadcasters, breach of which would establish liability; 
and (3) to treat the matter as caveat without a positive 
pronouncement on it. The Institute voted seventeen to 
fourteen to treat the matter as caveat with the following 
comment appearing in their Restatement:
A libel may be published by broadcasting over 
the air by means of the radio, if the speaker 
reads from a prepared manuscript or speaks from 
written or printed notes or memoranda. Whether 
an extemporaneous broadcast is a libel or a 
slander depends on factors stated in subsection (3).(172)
Subsection 3 calls for consideration of the geographic area 
in which dissemination occurs, the deliberation and pre­
meditation of the publication, and the persistence of the 
defamatory conduct.(173)
Strict Liability
Strict liability evolved from the English courts where 
the defendant was held liable without regard to whether he 
was negligent, (174) whether he intended to harm the plain­
tiff (175) or whether he might in fact have intended to 
praise the plaintiff. (176) The only limitation placed upon 
liability required the defamatory meaning to be "reasonably 
conveyed to and understood by others"(177) as referring to
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the plaintiff and harming the plaintiff.
Those favoring application of strict liability to 
broadcasters argue that the active participation of the 
broadcaster is necessary for publication of defamation; 
that the law of defamation imposes the risk of publication 
upon the publisher rather than the victim; and that owners 
of radio and television stations enter such a business with 
the awareness of certain risks. (178) strict liability 
would impose joint liability upon the broadcaster and the 
speaker in their capacity as publishers and would "abolish 
any distinction between defamation from a script and defama­
tion by an extemporaneous remark."(179) These theorists 
contend that a station would protect itself by taking 
proper corrective measures.(180) What some theorists fear, 
however, is that "victims" of harmless remarks would create 
a "flood of litigation" thereby congesting the courts with 
trivial matters; and that information, analysis, political 
viewpoints, and entertainment would be curtailed by broad­
casters to avoid liability. (181)
Negligence
Proponents of the negligence basis note that negligence 
would provide the courts with a familiar standard of re­
quired conduct for the defendant; that the plaintiff would 
be required to prove actual damages; and that the burden of 
proof would be on the plaintiff and the defendant could pre­
sent whatever defenses might exist.(182) These theorists
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further reason that since a broadcast is subject to very 
little control, the laws of negligence would provide the 
only equitable result. The principle objection to this 
approach arises where the plaintiff suffers an unwarranted 
hardship and the broadcaster was not in any way negligent, 
yet the station accrues a benefit through increased aud­
ience or product appeal.(183)
Search to Balance Interests
Neither the strict liability approach nor the neg­
ligence standard balance the interests between the rights 
of defamed individuals as contrasted with the rights of 
society to be informed and the rights of broadcasters to 
exercise free speech. Absolute liability places an un­
warranted burden upon the defendant (broadcaster) and could 
even stifle the flow of information in a free society. The 
negligence requirement tips the balance in the other di­
rection by requiring the plaintiff to fulfill the almost 
impossible task of proving negligence.(184) Hence, the 
courts need a new basis of liability to balance these in­
terests and provide a workable method of deciding broadcast 
defamation cases.
Res Ipsa Loquitor
A 1964 Houston Law Review article suggests application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to balance the in­
terests. (185) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor would re­
quire the plaintiff to prove three conditions which must be
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present in a defamatory broadcast for the broadcaster to be 
held liable. These conditions, as they have been estab­
lished in the law of negligence, require that: "(1) the 
damage must be of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in 
the absence of negligence; (2) it must be caused by an in­
strumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; 
and (3) it must not be due to any voluntary act on the 
part of the plaintiff(186) The article explains that this 
doctrine would provide for an equal balance of interests:
The plaintiff, to establish the inference of 
negligence, must prove that the three con­
ditions are present. The defendant would have 
the opportunity to rebut the inference of neg­
ligence. The plaintiff would have difficulty 
proving the actual operations of a radio or 
television station, whereas this would not 
present a problem to the defendant. Each party 
would be required to prove up certain elements, 
but neither party would be hindered by an unjust 
burden of proof.(187)
Thus, the res ipsa loquitor doctrine would provide an eq­
uitable and workable basis of liability from which both the 
plaintiff and defendant could present arguments germane to 
a particular case. With this basis of liability, the de­
fendant would have to prove a lack of negligence and the 
plaintiff would have to counter with proof that the defendant 
has received a benefit. The jury would be free to make 
equitable compensations in particular cases.
Determination of Damages
When a defendant is found liable, damages flow as a 
natural result. These damages are a "pecuniary compensation
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or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts by any 
person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether 
to his person, property, or rights, through an unlawful act 
or omission or negligence of a n o t h e r (188) Types of dam­
ages, statutes regulating damages, mitigation of damages, 
and theories of compensation should be considered with their 
application to broadcast defamation.
Types of Damages
Black1s Law Dictionary defines thirty-four different 
types of damages. (189) The three most common divisions of 
damage applicable to broadcast defamation are general, 
special, and exemplary damages. General damages are awarded 
for "loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt 
feelings, " (190) and are implied or presumed "to have ac­
crued from the wrong complained of . . . without reference
to the special character, condition, or circumstances of 
the plaintiff. (191) Special damages are those which the 
plaintiff alleges and proves for his actual and real loss 
or injury. (192) Exemplary damages are awarded to the plain­
tiff as a means of punishing the defendant for actual 
malice.(193)
General Damages. General damages are awarded to the 
plaintiff with the presumption that a defamatory imputation 
would cause a harm to the plaintiff's reputation, implied 
in the law without actual proof of harm in a particular 
case. Imputations which are held slanderous per se or
46
libelous per se presume that damage has resulted.
Special Damages. Special damages require proof of 
actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation. In order to 
collect special damages, the plaintiff must allege and 
prove that a certain defamatory imputation caused a harm 
to his reputation. Imputations which are held to be slan­
derous per quod, and in some cases libelous per quod, re­
quire proof of actual damage.
Exemplary Damages. Exemplary damages are awarded upon 
proof of actual malice on the part of a defendant.(194)
This malice will not be presumed from the broadcast, but 
must be proved by the plaintiff. Exemplary damages punish 
the defendant for his malicious behavior thereby making an 
example of him. Exemplary damages are sometimes referred 
to as punitive or vindictive damages.
Statutes Regulating Damages
There is no set rule for awarding damages as each 
jurisdiction has its own peculiar adaptations. The National 
Association of Broadcaster's model statute advocates the 
use of only special damages requiring the plaintiff to al­
lege and prove damages in each case. The majority of juris­
dictions, however, allow general or exemplary damages or both 
to be recovered in certain instances. In addition, some 
states punish broadcast defamation criminally, and others 




Section 3 of the National Association of Broadcaster's 
model statute provides that "the complaining party shall 
be allowed only such actual damages as he has alleged and 
proved."(195) Arizona, (196) Nebraska, (197) and Wyoming(198) 
have adopted the provision verbatim, while Georgia's 
statute(i99) provides that the complaining party shall be 
allowed only "actual consequences, or punitive" damages 
which have been alleged and proved. Louisiana, (200)
Oregon, (201) and Maryland(202) provide recovery of damages 
for actual injury suffered, although their statutes are 
worded somewhat differently.
The Majority Rule. Legislation requiring proof of 
damage in libel has been enacted in at least sixteen 
states; (203) however, the majority of jurisdictions appear 
to follow the common law rule that certain imputations are 
actionable per se without proof of damage. In situations 
where the imputation was not actionable per se, these 
courts hold that damages must be alleged and proved.
Criminal Punishment. Thirty-three states have some 
form of criminal punishment for broadcast defamation.(204) 
This punishment varies from California's statute(205) pro­
viding for "a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or
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by both such fine and imprisonment" to a more lenient North 
Dakota statute which calls for "a fine of not more than 
one thousand dollars."(206) Thus, in the majority of 
states a broadcaster may be subjected to both criminal 
and civil liability.
Retraction Statutes. Ten states have retraction 
statutes whereby a defendant may retract statements made 
in a defamatory broadcast. (207) These statutes usually 
provide that only actual damage may be recovered if a re­
traction is published and there is no malice on the part 
of the defendant.
Mitigation of Damages
Damages may be reduced or mitigated by "facts which 
show that the plaintiff's conceded cause of action does 
not entitle him to so large an amount as the showing on 
his side would otherwise justify the jury in allowing 
him."(208) might therefore be argued that damages
should be mitigated through retraction statements, through 
the plaintiff's exercise of his right of reply, and by 
proof that certain statements were true.
Retraction Statements. Under common law, a retraction 
made immediately after the defamation served to exonerate 
the defendant, provided that the defamatory imputations did 
not have time to make an impression and be spread further. 
Retractions have three additional functions: (209) to show
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that the plaintiff has suffered less than he claims with 
regard to actual damages, (210) to reduce or negate the 
"malice" or outrageous conduct which form the basis for 
exemplary damages, (211) and to provide evidence of the 
defendant's good motives and intentions in exercising a 
privilege. -̂̂ -2) A refusal to retract when a request has 
been made may be evidence of malevolence or improper pur­
pose on the part of a defendant. (213) ^ retraction must
be full and unequivocal^^^ with reference to the original 
publication (215) and must be more than a mere offer to pub­
lish any statement which the plaintiff cares to make.(216)
Right of Reply. In 1822 France enacted press legis­
lation which provided a right of reply under which a plain­
tiff may publish his own version of a matter with the use 
of a defendant's (newspaper) facilities. (217) This French 
right influenced the enactment of similar legislation in 
most European and South American countries. (218) The 
French law permits a reply to expressions of opinion as 
well as fact and allows the person replying to express his 
own point of view. This right is also provided in 
Nevada's (219) general reply statute and the right has been 
granted to political candidates in Mississippi. (220) in 
addition, Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 
1934 provides a limited right of reply over radio and tele­
vision. Section 315 requires a station which permits one 
legally qualified candidate to use its facilities to afford
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equal opportunities to all other candidates for that office.
Richard C. Donnelly contends in a 1948 Virginia Law
Review article that it should be possible
for a person who feels aggrieved by a state­
ment . . .  to avenge his reputation without 
having to resort to the sordid procedure of 
a law suit to recover damages; to provide 
him with a form of relief more appropriate 
to the type of harm sustained. Second, is 
to make newspapers and other media of mass 
communications serve as better instrumental­
ities for the dissemination of conflicting 
and divergent points of view . . . freedom
is more than freedom from; it should be 
freedom for . . .(221)
In cases where a broadcaster did not believe the statement 
to be defamatory, Donnelly suggests that a defendant (broad­
caster) should be given a choice to retract an allegedly 
defamatory statement or offer the defamed individual a 
chance to reply to the statement. With this innovation 
in the law, either a defendant's retraction or a plaintiff's 
reply could be used to mitigate damages and in some cases 
completely exonerate a broadcaster from liability.
Truth. In the present law, truth is a complete de­
fense from liability. This defense exists despite the fact 
that a defendant may have published remarks for morally 
indefensible and malevolent reasons.(222) Certainly, a 
defendant should be required to have a purpose in harming 
someone's reputation, regardless of the truthfulness of his 
imputations. For this reason, there is significant support 
for "dropping" truth as a complete defense and reserving
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its use for the mitigation of damages.(223)
Theories of Compensation
There appear to be three theories of compensation: 
monetary reimbursement, monetary benefit, and restoration 
of the plaintiff's reputation. The theories differ in their 
requirements for the proof of damage, their concern for the 
reputation of a plaintiff, and their effect upon the free 
flow of information in a free society.
Monetary Reimbursement Theory. The theory of monetary 
reimbursement would require the plaintiff to prove special 
damages, as in slander per quod and libel per quod cases. 
Although there may be times when a plaintiff is harmed 
without a clear ability to prove damages, the theory rests 
upon the belief that a defendant should compensate a plain­
tiff for only actual damages. Hence, this theory is 
weighted heavily in favor of the defendant and provides 
little opportunity for the plaintiff to restore his reputa­
tion.
Monetary Benefit Theory. The monetary benefit theory 
would not require the plaintiff to prove damages, but 
rather would award them on the basis of the defamatory 
nature of certain imputations or proof of actual malice. 
General damages would be awarded in slander per se and libel 
per se cases. Exemplary damages would be awarded for proof 
of actual malice on the part of the defendant. This theory
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of awarding damages without proof of harm raises two prob­
lems: (1) the free flow of information in a free society
may be stifled and restrained; and (2) certain imputations 
are not indefinitely actionable. An English writer ex­
presses concern for the first problem, in stating
There is danger in this hypersensitiveness, for 
not only does it produce quite unmerited wind­
falls for the lucky litigants, but also it may 
tend to check and restrain the press in the 
exercise of its duty of making legitimate cri­
ticism and comment.(224)
Judge Fuld in Mencher v. Chesley discussed the second area 
of concern:
Whether language has that tendency (being action­
able without proof of special damage) depends, 
among other factors, upon the temper of the times, 
the current of contemporary public opinion, with 
the result that words, harmless in one age, in 
one community, may be highly damaging to reputa­
tion at another time or in a different place.(225)
Restoration of the Plaintiff 1s Reputation. Restoration 
of the plaintiff's reputation could be partially accomplished 
through a statement of reply or retraction. In cases where 
this reply or retraction would be inadequate for the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff, a law suit in which actual 
damages would be proved and public awareness would be 
evoked could further repair the plaintiff's reputation.
Thus, the emphasis would be upon restoration of the plain­
tiff's reputation, rather than strict reimbursement or bene­
fit. Although this theory is not presently applied to the 
law of broadcast defamation,(226) appears to provide
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maximum freedom of speech with sufficient protection of an 
individual's interest in his reputation.
Defenses Against Charges of Defamation
A defendant may be exonerated from liability by estab­
lishing the defense of an absolute privilege, a qualified 
privilege, or truth. An absolute privilege protects a 
speaker or publisher, without reference to his motives or 
the truth or falsity of a statement, for statements made 
in judicial proceedings, in legislative proceedings, in 
executive communications, with the consent of the plain­
tiff, between husband and wife, and in political broad­
casts under section 315. (227) A qualified privilege pro­
tects the defendant, unless actual malice and knowledge of 
the falsity of the statement is shown, for communication in 
the interest of the publisher, in the interest of a close 
associate, in the interest of a business function, with one 
who may act in the public interest, in the interest of 
public concern and fair comment, or in the public's interest 
to be informed through reports of public proceedings.(228)
In addition, most jurisdictions have held that truth is a 
complete defense regardless of the defendant's motives.
Absolute Privilege
An absolute privilege completely protects a defendant 
from liability, regardless of his motives in publishing a 
statement or the truth or falsity of a statement. The
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clearest instance where broadcasters are provided an ab­
solute privilege occurs when political candidates speak 
under Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. Al­
though the privilege covers a small part of a broadcast 
day, the protection of the privilege in cases where it is 
applied is significant.
Judicial Proceedings. An absolute privilege extends 
to anything that may be said in relation to a matter at 
issue regarding any hearing before a tribunal which per­
forms a judicial function. The immunity does not cover 
publications made before commencement or after termination 
of the official proceedings. It is also clear that state­
ments given to the media concerning judicial proceedings 
are not absolutely privileged.(229)
Legislative Proceedings. Whatever is said in the 
course of legislative proceedings is absolutely privileged 
with regard to what the legislators might say. When these 
statements are republished outside of the legislature, the 
absolute privilege is lost. (230) in the case where legis­
lative proceedings are recorded by radio and television, 
the broadcaster receives a qualified rather than an ab­
solute privilege.(231)
Executive Communications. In the discharge of their 
duties, executive officers of the government, primarily on 
the national level, are privileged to communicate with ab­
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solute immunity. This privilege is extended to press re­
leases whereby officials may explain their actions to the 
public, including "all publications within the 'outer 
perimeter' of their 'line of duty.'"(232)
Consent of the Plaintiff. When the plaintiff consents 
to a publication, he cannot complain about later damages 
to his reputation. (233) This consent must be more than a 
request to speak, (234) an inquiry to what is meant, or 
consent to a different form or content of publication.(23j )
Political Broadcasts. Section 315 of the Federal 
Communications Act provides that broadcasters shall afford 
equal opportunities to all political candidates, and that 
the station shall have no power of censorship. This has 
been interpreted to mean that a broadcaster may not refuse 
any legally qualified candidate if one is allowed to speak, 
nor may he exert any control over what is said. (236) since 
publication in this regard is required by law, the broad­
caster receives absolute immunity.
Qualified Privilege
A qualified privilege results when a publication is 
"firmly made by a person in the discharge of some public 
or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct 
of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is con­
cerned. " (237) The immunity from liability is conditioned 
upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper
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purpose.(238)
Fair Comment on Matters of Public Concern. Although 
the constitutional guarantee of free speech does not confer 
a privilege to publish defamatory materials merely because 
it has "news" value and the public would like to hear 
it, (239) the privilege does extend to matters which are 
of legitimate concern to the community.(240) This pri­
vilege relates to the discussion of the administration of 
public affairs,(241) the conduct or qualifications of public 
officers or candidates,(242) or employees,(243) the spending 
of public funds, (244) the management of institutions,(245) 
the affairs of private enterprise which affect the general 
interest of the community, (246) ancj anything submitted to 
the public for approval such as a book, sports event, or 
scientific discovery.(247)
For this reason broadcasters may provide comment upon 
matters of public concern with assurance that the con­
stitutional guarantee of freedom of speech includes the 
qualified privilege of making controversial statements 
about individuals. The Supreme Court in New York Times 
Company v. Sullivan(248) extended this privilege to false 
statements of fact about individuals connected with all 
matters of public concern.(249) jn these instances, as in 
all matters providing a qualified privilege, the communica­
tion is privileged unless actual malice or improper intent 
can be associated with the publisher.
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Reports of Public Proceedings. It has been reasoned 
that a reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye 
and that public affairs should be made known to all.(250)
By this reasoning, the reporting of legislative proceed­
ings,^^-) investigation of committees, (252) deliberations 
of municipal c o u n c i l s , a n d  official governmental 
reports and communications(254) may be conducted under the 
claim of privilege. This privilege does not extend to 
reports of a private group,(255) unless the meeting is 
open to the public, and what is said bears upon the public 
interest.(256) has been held that reports of this
nature, having a qualified privilege, must be substantially 
accurate and must state the source of what is being re­
ported. (257)
Truth as a Defense
The old English rule held that "the greater the truth 
the greater the libel." Most American jurisdictions have 
now reversed this rule and hold that truth is a complete 
defense.(258) Ten states have statutory provisions re­
quiring that the publication must be made with good motives 
and for justifiable ends.(259) In the majority of juris­
dictions, however, it is "immaterial that the defendant 
published the facts for no good reason or for the worst 
possible motives, or even that he did not believe at the 
time that they were true."(260) This rule has been attacked 
on the grounds that "it affords immunity for morally inde-
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fensible malevolence and needlessly kicking a man when he 
is down."(261) ^ more reasonable approach would consider 
truth as a qualified privilege.
CHAPTER III
DEFAMACAST AS A NEW TORT 
IMPLICATION OF THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS
General Background
Although there has been disagreement as to the direc­
tion in which the law of broadcast defamation should move, 
the writer will theoretically revamp the entire law. De- 
famacast, defamation by broadcast, will be considered as 
a new tort v/ith related lower level concepts. Concept­
ualization of this new tort will be accomplished through 
a suggested model statute at the federal level. This 
model statute will establish a federal cause of action; 
a sound basis of liability; general, special, and exem­
plary damages; provisions for retraction and reply state­
ments; and modifications of our present absolute and qual­
ified privileges. The proposed federal law will be ad­
vantageous: first, by eliminating most conflict of law
problems; second, by removing the inappropriate distinctions 
from the law; third, by balancing the interests of the 
plaintiff and defendant; fourth, by curbing mass media 
injuries to personality; fifth, by allowing maximum free 
speech with sufficient protection for the individual; and 
sixth, by protecting the public from unfair manipulations
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of media equipment. The dimensions of the new tort will 
be further explained through a hypothetical projection of 
possible litigation.
A Federal Model Statute
Construction of a model statute at the federal level 
would significantly change our present concepts of defama­
tion by broadcast. Although the term defamacast is not 
specified in the model statute, the term could be used by 
the courts to refer to the distinct tort of defamation by 
radio and television. The proposed law follows.
Defamation by Radio and Television
Section 1 This act hereby establishes a federal law of 
broadcast defamation.
Section 2 Any victim of defamation emitted from the media 
of radio and television shall have a cause of action 
against any broadcaster engaged in disseminating such 
defamatory communications as well as any originator or 
publisher of the communication. The defamed party, whether 
an individual or a group of individuals, shall be required 
to prove that such imputations were of a defamatory nature 
as established in the laws of precedent or as indicated 
by the facts of a particular case; whereupon, a jury trial 
shall determine whether or not a disseminator or publisher 
is liable based upon the malice standard, negligence theory, 
or the res ipsa loquitor doctrine.
Section 3 Any dissemination or publication of defamatory 
materials, whether true or untrue, whether privileged or 
not privileged, whether creating an anticipated or an 
unanticipated effect, which is broadcast with a malicious 
or wrongful intent shall subject all persons or groups of 
persons with that intent to liability.
Section 4 A disseminator or publisher shall be liable for 
any act of negligence where a defendant breached a duty 
under the circumstance to exercise due care to prevent a 
defamatory broadcast.
61
Section 5 Any disseminator or publisher of defamation 
shall be liable when a presumption of negligence is estab­
lished through application of the res ipsa loquitor doc­
trine, whereby (1) the damage in a particular case was of 
a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of 
negligence, (2) the harm was caused by an instrumentality 
within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the 
imputation was not due to any voluntary act on the part of 
the plaintiff.
Section 6 As compensation for loss to a plaintiff's repu­
tation, a jury shall award either general damages which 
are implied in the law without proof of actual harm; 
special damages which require proof of actual harm to the 
plaintiff's reputation; exemplary damages which are awarded 
upon proof of actual malice or wrongful intent; or any 
combination of these damages. A plaintiff shall recover 
whatever damages are awarded from all defendants in a single 
trial and shall have no further cause of action for the 
original matter of litigation with the only remaining right 
being that of appeal to a higher court.
Section 7 A broadcaster shall make a reasonable effort to 
retract imputations which are untrue or accidentally broad­
cast or clearly defamatory where a complete and unequivocal 
retraction is agreed to by the defamed party or is designed 
to repair the injured party's reputation. A retraction 
broadcasted in this manner shall be considered in determin­
ation of liability and assessment of damages.
Section 8 Any individual or group defamed over radio or 
television shall have a right of reply to defamatory al­
legations whereby the public may be informed of the truth. 
This right may be denied by a broadcaster where he does 
not feel a reply is necessary or appropriate, whereupon the 
allegedly defamed individual may present his case to a 
local magistrate in an effort to receive a court order to 
enforce the right of reply. The local magistrate shall 
grant or deny the right of reply based upon the circum­
stances of the case. A reply broadcasted in this manner 
shall be considered in determination of liability and 
assessment of damages.
Section 9 There is no absolute privilege to broadcast de­
famatory imputations with the exception of a public official 
explaining his actions to the public, a plaintiff consenting 
to a publication, a political candidate speaking under 
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, or any other 
exceptions granted by Congress.
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Section 10 A qualified privilege shall be extended to 
broadcasters to report the affairs of public proceedings, 
to make fair comment regarding matters of public concern, 
to broadcast truthful defamatory imputations, and to 
manipulate media equipment in all aspects of broadcasting. 
In these and other instances as established by Congress 
and the courts, a broadcaster shall not be liable without 
proof of actual malice or wrongful intent.
Implications of the Proposed Innovations
In order that each of the sections of the model statute 
shall be interpreted as intended, the sections will be 
explained in greater detail. The implicatory meanings of 
the specific words of the various sections shall be con­
sidered for the purpose of explanation and analysis.
Implications of Section _1
A federal law of broadcast defamation would supersede 
all state laws which conflict with any of the provisions 
set forth in the statute. Similarly, all courts at the 
federal, state, and local levels would be required to hold 
in accordance with the federal law regardless of previous 
holdings under common law. In cases where a matter is at 
issue which is not provided for under this statute, the 
courts would be free to apply whatever statutory or common 
law principles appear applicable in a particular case.
Implications of Section 2_
A person defamed by a radio or television broadcast 
would have a cause of action against the publisher, person 
initiating the defamation, and the disseminator, broad­
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caster, upon establishing to a local magistrate that cer­
tain imputations were of a defamatory nature. Imputations 
of a defamatory nature would include words which have been 
established as defamatory in the laws of precedent, verbal 
and non-verbal communications which a reasonable person 
might interpret as being defamatory, and manipulation of 
media equipment which a reasonable person might interpret 
as harming the plaintiff's reputation. A local magistrate 
would determine whether the individual had a significant 
cause of action to be sent to the jury. If the plaintiff 
had a cause of action, and the defendant did not have a 
privilege or a clear defense, the case would be sent to the 
jury for the determination regarding liability and the 
possible assessment of damages.
Implications of Section 3̂
The state of mind of a broadcaster or disseminator, at 
the time of a broadcast or before a broadcast, may form the 
basis of liability. Although actual malice or wrongful 
purpose may be difficult to prove, it offers the plaintiff 
an opportunity to recover damages without proof or implica­
tion that the defendant was negligent. Instead, liability 
is based upon a wrongful intent or purpose which accom­
panied a defamatory broadcast, but may not have in itself 
caused the imputation.
Implications of Section 4_
A defendant would be liable for the breach of a duty
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which was the proximate cause of a defamacast. This duty 
would amount to an exercise of due care to prevent defama­
tory broadcasts. In all cases where the defendant is 
charged with negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant owed a duty to exercise due care under the cir­
cumstances in a particular case.
Implications of Section _5
In cases where a plaintiff is unable to prove neg­
ligence, that plaintiff may allege that negligence should 
be presumed under the res ipsa loqui-fcor doctrine. This 
doctrine provides a presumption of negligence for defama­
tion which would not ordinarily occur in the absence of 
negligence. A defendant could defeat the presumption 
through proof that active, overt action by the plaintiff 
or a third person caused the defamatory broadcast; that 
the defendant lacked control or a right to control the 
facilities; that the negligence of a third party caused the 
defamation to occur; or that an act of God caused the def­
amation to occur. Similarly, a defendant could either 
defeat recovery or reduce damages through proof of con­
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. If the 
actions of a plaintiff which cause defamation to occur are 
interpreted as a voluntary act, beyond negligence, the 
plaintiff cannot recover damages.
Implications of Section 6
Damages are awarded as compensation for a wrong done
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to a plaintiff. General damages are awarded with the 
assumption that the plaintiff has suffered a harm to his 
reputation. The extent of that harm need not be proven 
in every case. If the plaintiff alleges and proves actual 
harm or loss, special damages, the jury may award damages 
to the extent warranted by the proof. In cases where the 
defendant harbored a malicious or wrongful intent while 
publishing or disseminating defamation, the plaintiff may 
be awarded exemplary damages upon proof of such intent on 
the part of the defendant, without the necessity of proving 
actual harm or loss to his reputation. It therefore 
becomes imperative that the courts use their best judg­
ment in awarding damages.
This section limits a plaintiff to one cause of action 
for damages against all of the defendants in a single 
trial. Once the trial is in progress, a plaintiff will 
have no further causes of action for that defamatory broad­
cast. Hence, the single publications rule will be applied 
with the additional requirement that the causes of action 
be brought against all defendants in a single trial. The 
only right of either the plaintiff or the defendant beyond 
the actual trial would be a right of review or appeal to a 
higher court.
Implications of Section 1_
When defamacast occurs, the broadcaster has a duty to 
make a reasonable effort to retract the imputation, if
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possible, especially in cases where defamacast occurs by 
accident, appears to be untrue, or is clearly of a defama­
tory nature. The broadcaster must, however, use caution 
not to issue a retraction which would only add to the 
defamation. To guard against the possibility of making 
an improper retraction the broadcaster should, whenever 
possible, receive the written consent of the allegedly 
defamed party. In any event, the broadcasted retraction 
should be complete and unequivocal, and designed to repair 
the injured party's reputation. A proper or an improper 
retraction, including any aspect of a refusal or offer to 
retract, should be considered by a jury in determination 
of liability and assessment of damages.
Implications of Section 8̂
As a minimal requirement of free speech, a right of 
reply allows an allegedly defamed individual to reply to 
certain previous imputations. This reply can be made over 
the same media which broadcasted the imputations. If the 
right of reply is denied by a broadcaster on the basis of 
it being unnecessary or inappropriate, the allegedly de­
famed individual will have one remaining chance to enforce 
the right of reply. He may present his case to a local 
magistrate with the hope that the local magistrate will 
issue a court order to enforce the right of reply. The 
circumstances surrounding the granting or denial of this 
right, as well as the content and effect of. a broadcasted
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reply, may be used as evidence in court for determination 
of liability and assessment of damages.
Implications of Section 9_
An absolute privilege, which completely relieves a 
defendant from liability, will not be granted with four 
exceptions: (1) When a public official explains his actions
to the public, the official and the disseminator of his 
information are relieved of liability with regard to what 
the official communicates to the public. (2) When a 
plaintiff consents to a defamatory publication, the de­
fendant is not liable. (3) When a political candidate 
speaks under Section 315 of the Federal Communications 
Act, the broadcaster has an absolute privilege to dis­
seminate the candidate's speech without liability; however, 
the candidate may be liable for his own statements. (4) Any 
other exceptions specifically provided for by Congress shall 
be included.
Implications of Section 10
A qualified privilege, which relieves a defendant of 
liability where there is no proof of actual malice or 
wrongful intent, shields broadcasters with a privilege 
(1) to report matters of public concern which are of legit­
imate concern to the community including publication of 
false statements of fact about individuals connected with 
all matters of public concern; (2) to report the affairs 
of public proceedings including legislative proceedings,
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investigation of committees, deliberations of municipal 
councils, and official governmental reports and communica­
tions; (3) to broadcast truthful defamatory imputations; 
and (4) to manipulate media equipment in all aspects of 
broadcasting.
Advantages of the Proposed Changes 
In order to freely accept change, one must recognize 
potential advantages to be accrued from that change. The 
writer's proposed model statute offers improvements over 
the status quo which will benefit plaintiffs, defendants, 
broadcasters, individuals who have been defamed, and the 
general public.
Elimination of Most Conflict of Lav; Problems
A federal law of defamacast with a federal cause of 
action, with a single publications rule, and with the re­
quirement that all defendants be charged in a single trial 
would eliminate our present choice and conflict of law 
problems. This law would mark the end of jurisdictional 
squabbles to determine which state's law should apply. The 
federal law would recognize the interstate nature of the 
tort and would treat it as a single wrongful act for a 
plaintiff to seek compensation from all applicable defend­
ants .
Eradication of the Irrational and Anomolous Distinctions. 
The categories between slander per se, slander per
69
quod, libel per se, libel per quod, defamation from a pre­
pared script, and ad-libed defamation would be discarded. 
Certain words would no longer be actionable per se thereby 
creating liability without proof of damages or negligence 
or anything else. Defamation from a script would no longer 
be libelous per se, but would be subjected to the same 
standards of proof as extemporaneous defamation. Thus, 
the distinctions which grew out of the sixteenth century 
would be discarded with regard to radio and television.
In their place, the plaintiff would be required to prove 
that certain imputations were of a defamatory nature and 
that the defendant either had a malicious or wrongful 
intent, or was negligent in either a direct or presumed 
manner.
Equalization of Interests
The proposed changes would provide several new options 
for both the plaintiff and the defendant which would more 
nearly balance the interests of each. Strict liability, 
as it is known under our present laws, places an undue 
burden upon a defendant, publisher, or disseminator, to be 
liable without proof of fault or actual damage. The neg­
ligence standard, without the option of a presumption under 
the res ipsa loquitor doctrine, places an unreasonable 
burden upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant 
breached a duty. The interests are more clearly balanced
when a plaintiff is given a choice to prove actual malice
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or wrongful intent, negligence, or presumed negligence. 
Although the plaintiff may not be able to prove negligence, 
it may be presumed through application of the res ipsa 
loquitor doctrine.
In addition, the plaintiff could also allege that the 
defendant refused to retract an imputation or offer the 
plaintiff a reply upon request. The defendant could argue 
that he offered the plaintiff a change to broadcast a re­
traction or reply, or in fact did broadcast a retraction 
or reply. Thus, more variables designed to balance the 
interests between these parties would be available for con­
sideration by the courts.
Minimization of Mass Media Injuries to Personality
With the discontinuance of truth as a complete de­
fense and absolute privilege, a broadcaster or disseminator 
would no longer be permitted to broadcast truthful defama­
tory imputations with a malicious and wrongful intent. If 
truthful defamatory imputations were published and dis­
seminated, the motives and state of mind of the publisher 
and disseminator must be sincere and forthright. This 
would afford a protection against unnecessary injuries to 
personality.
The categorization of the manipulation of mass media 
equipment as a qualified privilege serves the same purpose. 
Although it might be argued that manipulation of equipment 
should be subjected to a negligence standard of care,
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broadcasting equipment should at least be manipulated with­
out malice or wrongful intent.
The issuance of a retraction in certain circumstances 
may protect a person's reputation from significant harm. 
Certainly it is better to immediately repair the plain­
tiff's reputation, if possible, than to further burden that 
reputation through litigation designed to offer compensation 
for the defamatory imputation.
In the same manner, a timely and appropriate reply 
by a defamed person may tend to repair a person's reputa­
tion in the public's mind. It cannot be denied that a de­
famed person should have the right to speak the truth as 
he sees it regarding his own reputation.
Allowance of Maximum Free Speech with Sufficient Individual 
Protection
The rights of retraction and reply are found implied 
in the first amendment's Constitutional guarantee of free 
speech. Any other interpretation would suggest that one­
way communication without provisions for defense and reply 
to allegations is our concept of free speech. Certainly, 
by free speech we do not mean freedom for the media powers 
to castigate an individual in our society with not as much 
as a "whimper" in terms of a retraction by the publisher 
or disseminator of the imputation, or a reply by the tra­
duced individual. Our concept of free speech and fair play 
is more equitable than that. Our ideals are broad enough
to condone a free flow of information in a free society.
The extension of the New York Times' "malice stan­
dard" to all matters of public concern is a furtherance 
of this concept of free speech. It is essential that the 
media of radio and television broadcast "news" of a public 
interest to the public without fear of litigation, pro­
vided that these media do not entertain a malicious or 
wrongful intent.
Protection from Unfair Manipulation of Media Equipment
Manipulation of camera lenses, color tones, vocal 
intonations, and other equipment and techniques may in 
certain cases defame an individual over radio or tele­
vision. That our present laws make no provision for this 
type of defamation is unconscionable. The manipulations 
of mass media may cause millions of viewers to perceive 
an individual in an unrealistic and defamatory sense. 
Certainly, it is in the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity to provide at least a minimal degree of pro­
tection by limiting such manipulation to that conducted 
with a rightful purpose and intent.
A Hypothetical Case
For the purpose of theoretically projecting applica­
tions of proposed innovations in the lav;, the writer has 
chosen to expand the hypothetical example of a defamatory 
broadcast as recorded in the introduction of this research. 
Let us assume that Mr. Joke Teller was an emcee of a
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nationally televised variety program which experienced a 
decline in ratings. The sponsors of the program insisted 
that the program increase its ratings or face the pos­
sibility of being dropped by the sponsors. The program 
directors instructed Joke Teller to enliven his program 
in an effort to boost the program's ratings. Following 
these instructions, Joke Teller took it upon himself to 
tell two humorous stories in a nationally televised broad­
cast about Mr. Executive Citizen, who was a successful 
President of Appropriate Savings and Loan Association.
Joke Teller alleged that "The President of the largest 
savings and loan company in New York is a 'swinger'" noting 
that the "swinging activities usually take place in the 
Beautiful Islands and include many of the other executives 
in Appropriate." The emcee concluded with a final pun,
"If you desire to save and loan, go to Appropriate." One 
of the other guests on the show, Mr. Smart Guest, commented, 
"If I had as much money as he owes, it wouldn't be appro­
priate." The following day a local radio station added to 
the imputations by falsely reporting that "Appropriate 
Savings and Loan Association has a financial deficit of over 
two billion dollars."
Mr. Executive Citizen immediately contacted both the 
national television network and the local radio station 
demanding either a retraction or a right of reply. The 
national network denied both requests on the grounds that 
the statements were reportedly true and that a retraction
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or reply would only further spread the imputation. The 
local radio station denied the request on the grounds that 
its statements were true. Mr. Executive Citizen took his 
cases to a local magistrate who issued a court order to 
the local radio station to offer Mr. Citizen a right of 
reply, but denied the request of a national right of reply. 
Mr. Citizen was granted a two minute reply following the 
local station's main newscast whereupon he stated that 
"the statements concerning a broadcasted report of a 
financial deficit in Appropriate Savings and Loan were 
false. He further proceeded to explain and reveal the 
exact financial condition of Appropriate thereby "setting 
the record strait" as he called it.
Mr. Citizen, however, was not satisfied and proceeded 
to file separate actions against the national television 
network and the local radio station. A magistrate de­
termined that both broadcasts were of a defamatory nature 
and could not find a clear privilege or defense for either 
defendant. The matter was, therefore, sent to a jury.
In the course of the trial against the national net­
work, the plaintiff argued (1) that the imputations con­
cerning himself were not true, and even if they were, the 
defendant showed malice in not allowing a retraction or 
reply; (2) that a retraction or reply would have cleared 
the plaintiff's reputation in many parts of the country 
where his reputation was damaged; and (3) that the defend-
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and was negligent under the res ipsa loquitor doctrine 
for if it had not been for the negligence of someone in 
the network the statements would have been deleted during 
the "live" broadcast.
The defendant national network countered with argu­
ments that (1) the imputations were true, thereby pro­
viding a qualified privilege which would require proof of 
malice and the defendant network was completely unaware 
that Mr. Teller was going to make defamatory imputations;
(2) a retraction or reply would have enhanced rather than 
diminished the defamation if broadcasted nationally; and
(3) the defendant network was in no way negligent in 
carrying out its duty to protect the interest of the plain­
tiff, as the variety show was extemporaneous and out of 
the defendant's control.
The plaintiff asked for general damages of $500,000; 
special damages of $300,000; and exemplary damages of 
$300,000. Mr. Executive Citizen and the national network 
then proceeded to rest their cases with the jury.
In the same trial, the plaintiff brough a second 
action against Mr. Joke Teller, publisher of the alleged 
defamacast. Mr. Teller's only strong defense was that the 
defamatory statements were true. The plaintiff asked for 
$200,000 in general damages, $300,000 in special damages, 
and $300,000 in exemplary damages. After arguments had 
been heard from both sides, Mr. Citizen and Mr. Teller
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rested their cases with the jury.
The jury pronounced its verdict concerning both cases. 
The jury held in regard to the case against the national 
network that (1) the imputations concerning the plaintiff 
were true with the exception of Mr. Smart Guest's comment 
that "If I had as much money as he owes, it wouldn't be 
appropriate" which, although defamatory, was extemporaneous 
and Mr. Guest was not a defendant in this case; (2) the 
national network could not be liable under the res ipsa 
loquitor doctrine for the false statement by Mr. Smart 
because such a statement might normally slip by the censors 
because of its quick and short duration and difficulty to 
detect, although the defendant network was in exclusive 
control; and (3) the defendant's refusal to broadcast a 
retraction or reply did not constitute malice as a retraction 
or reply might only have further spread the imputation.
The jury however found that the defendant, Mr. Joke Teller, 
displayed a "malicious and wrongful intent" in broadcasting 
his truthful defamatory imputations concerning the plaintiff 
and awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in exemplary damages.
In the second trial the plaintiff, Appropriate Savings 
and Loan Association, brought an action against the defend­
ant, local radio station, for its follow-up news story 
with an enlargement of the facts which turned out to be 
untrue. The plaintiff alleged that (1) the defendant radio 
station was negligent in not more closely verifying the 
authenticity of its news; (2) even if the defendant were
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afforded a qualified privilege, he would be liable for 
malice in refusing to retract or offer a reply upon re­
quest by the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff's reply did 
not erase the imputation, but only stopped it from be­
coming even more serious. The defendant offered as de­
fenses (1) that a reasonable effort had been made to 
verify the accuracy of the news story; (2) that the station 
was afforded a qualified privilege to report a matter of 
public concern regarding the plaintiff and that the 
defendant exhibited no malice or wrongful intent; and 
(3) that the plaintiff's reply over the defendant's fa­
cilities eliminated any harm which could have been done.
The plaintiff asked for $300,000 in general damages, 
$300,000 in special damages, and $300,000 in exemplary 
damages.
After extensive deliberation, the jury held (1) that 
the defendant was afforded a qualified privilege to report 
matters of public concern, as the financial status of 
Appropriate Savings and Loan Association was a fair comment 
regarding a matter of public interest; and therefore, the 
defendant should not be held liable for negligence; (2) 
that the defendant should be held liable because of the 
malice and wrongful intent displayed by refusing to retract 
or offer a reply upon request by the plaintiff and not 
until forced to do so by a court order; and (3) that the 
plaintiff's reply over the defendant's station should go
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
With the advent of the printing press, Henry the VII 
established the crime of libel to suppress the publica­
tion of seditious materials. Since slander had previously 
been recognized by the law, the distinctions between 
slander and libel developed. Slander was considered to 
be oral defamation; while libel was defined as written 
defamation.
The introduction of the media of radio and television 
caused the slander-libel distinctions to expand, adding 
new categories and classifications. Courts recognized 
differences between slander per se, and slander per quod, 
libel per se, and libel per quod; defamation from a script 
and extemporaneous defamation; words which are actionable 
per se and words which require proof of special damage; 
defamation over radio and defamation over television. How­
ever, these distinctions and categories as applied to 
defamation by broadcast proved anomalous and unacceptable.
As a result, in 1962 a Georgia court in American 
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson recognized 
the distinct characteristics of defamation by broadcast 
and created a new tort which it termed defamacast. Defama-
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cast, which simply means defamation by broadcast, has not 
been accepted as a new tort in more than a few juris­
dictions; however, the need for a separate tort for defama­
tion by broadcast has been recognized by a number of legal 
theorists.
In fact, present laws of broadcast defamation have 
generated several problems constituting reasons for 
concern: (1) The laws vary from state to state resulting
in conflict of laws. (2) The slander-libel distinctions 
as applied to radio and television result in grave in­
equities and impractical adaptations. (3) Arbitrary lines 
drawn between actionable and non-actionable words destroy 
the balance between free speech and the rights of a defamed 
individual. (4) Present standards of liability for broad­
cast defamation are unacceptable. (5) Media injuries to 
personality are placed in a low level category of consider­
ation. (6) The law neglects consideration of potentially 
harmful aspects of radio and televised communications.
With justifiable reasons for concern, the writer ex­
tracted applicable legal principles for the construction 
of a new law, and considered the implications of the 
theoretical dimensions of defamacast as a new tort. Defama- 
cast was considered, not merely as a barbarous new term, 
but as a new tort with recognizable dimensions and related 
lower level concepts. This was accomplished in the form 
of a model federal law of broadcast defamation.
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The extraction and explication of applicable legal 
principles provided a basis for construction of the pro­
posed statute. The Uniform Single Publications Act which 
six states have adopted was incorporated to minimize con­
flict of law problems. The res ipsa loquitor doctrine 
which has been a workable part of tort law was applied 
to balance interests between plaintiffs and defendants. 
General, special, and exemplary damages were retained in 
the law to provide alternative methods of compensation.
The right of retraction, which ten states have recognized 
in their statutes; and the right of reply, which European 
and South American countries have provided in their press 
(newspaper) legislation, were written into the law to 
encourage free speech. Finally, absolute and qualified 
privileges were modified in the proposed statute to 
achieve equitable results.
Thus, the goal of this research was to construct a 
federal law which would eliminate conflict of law prob­
lems, irrational distinctions, favoritism toward a plain­
tiff or a defendant, media injuries to personality, and 
unfair manipulations of media equipment. The effectiveness 
of the proposed law in meeting these criteria may never be 
tested; however, the efforts to adapt our laws to the media 
of radio and television will inevitably transpire.
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